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As humans, our thoughts are not “stuck in time.” Indeed, it is our ability to mentally dissociate ourselves from the present that allows us to recall the past and plan for our future (mental time travel). We can also reason about what others might be thinking (mental attribution) and thus dissociate ourselves from other selves. Many psychologists have argued that these two forms of mental projection into other times and other minds are unique to humans and that the six-layered prefrontal cortex is the necessary platform for such intelligence.  Recent studies challenge these assumptions, however, and some of the most convincing evidence comes not from our closest relatives, the great apes, but from a surprisingly smart, large-brained bird, the western scrub-jay. 

Like many other members of the crow family (corvids), these birds hide food for the future and go to great lengths to prevent other birds from stealing their caches. In terms of recalling the past, these birds form complex, highly flexible and integrated memories of the “what, where and when” of specific past caching episodes. They also recall whether another individual was present at the time of caching, and if so, which bird was watching when, and take protective action accordingly, suggesting that they may also be aware of others’ knowledge states. This behaviour is only seen in experienced jays that have been thieves themselves in the past, however. Naïve birds that had no thieving experience do not do so, a result that raises the intriguing possibility that experienced jays are able to simulate another bird’s viewpoint. Finally, recent work demonstrates that the jays also make provision for a future need and will cache more food in places in which they will not be given breakfast the following morning than in places where they will receive breakfast the next morning, even though there is plenty of food available to them to consume at the time of making their caching decisions. 








Many psychologists have argued that the ability to travel backwards and forwards in the mind’s eye to recollect specific past events and imagine future scenarios is unique to humans. Particularly influential has been the Mental Time Travel hypothesis, in which Suddendorf and Corballis (1997, 2007) have argued that mental time travel is unique to humans and that its emergence was crucial in hominid evolution. According to this hypothesis, animals cannot recall past experiences (episodic memory) or anticipate future states (future planning) because they cannot dissociate themselves from the more or less immediate present; in essence, they are “stuck in time” because they are incapable of temporal perspective taking (Roberts 2002). By this argument, animals learn about the general relationships between stimuli and events from specific episodes without encoding temporal information that enables them to locate these episodes in the past, or when they occurred (e.g., Tulving 1983, 2002; Wheeler 2000). 

It has also been argued that humans are unique in being able to reason about what others might be thinking (mental attribution) and thus dissociate their own thought processes from those of others (e.g., Heyes 1998; Saxe 2006; Penn and Povinelli 2007). Indeed, many psychologists have argued that these two forms of mental projection into other times and other minds are two diagnostic features of human cognition. In this chapter, we shall challenge this assumption and argue that food caching by western scrub-jays is an exciting and promising model system for investigating these cognitive processes in animals. Furthermore, we shall argue that much of the success of this model stems from adopting an ethological approach by considering cases in nature in which mental time travel and mental attribution might be important for the animal’s survival, paying particular attention to the animal’s “Umwelt” or environment, in the broadest sense of the word. For the purposes of our argument, we shall take this to mean how the animal’s current ecological conditions and its past evolutionary history (i.e., the role of previous ecological pressures that were imposed upon its ancestors) have shaped the extent to which these two cognitive processes, namely mental time travel and mental attribution, control the animal’s behaviour, in our case in terms of the food-caching behaviour of the western scrub-jay. 

A major strength of using the food-caching paradigm to test for cognitive abilities lies in the combination of ethological validity and rigorous experimental control, because food-caching is a naturally occurring behaviour, one the jays “do for a living,” and consequently they will readily cache and recover food in the laboratory. Indeed an evolutionary analysis of the distribution of caching species among the many members of the corvid family reveals that the ancestor of the corvids was almost certainly a cacher (de Kort and Clayton 2006).  Furthermore, unlike many of the standard psychological tests of animal memory, these birds do not need to be trained to cache or recover. Yet, the very fact that memory for food caches can be tested in captive birds allows a level of control that would be difficult, if not impossible, in the field. For example, we can control for the time elapsed between caching and the first opportunity to recover that cache, as well as whether or not the animal can use cues emanating directly from the caches at the time of recovery. In addition, we can test hand-raised birds that have spent their lives in captivity, ones whose reinforcement histories are well documented and whose previous experiences can be experimentally manipulated. This level of control has, in fact, been essential in unravelling questions not only about their ability to remember past caching episodes but also for the experimental tests of whether they can plan for the future, and what they might know about the minds of other jays.

Food-Caching by Western Scrub-Jays as a Candidate for Assessing Whether Animals Understand Other Times

A number of animals hide or cache food for future consumption and form accurate, long-lasting memories of where their food caches are located. In laboratory experiments, for example, Western scrub-jays (Aphelocoma californica) can accurately remember cache locations for at least 250 days, and Clark’s Nutcrackers (Nucifraga columbiana) are even more accurate, with no evidence of forgetting for even longer periods of time (Bednekoff et al. 1997). At issue, however, is whether food-caching animals can remember specific past caching episodes in terms of what happened where and, importantly, when (Clayton and Dickinson 1998; Griffiths et al. 1999). 

Indeed, we have argued that the ability to remember the what, where and when of unique past episodes is the hallmark of episodic memory that can be tested in animals (Clayton et al. 2001a, 2003a; Salwiczek et al. 2008). Although language-based reports of episodic recall in humans suggest that the retrieved experiences are not only explicitly located in the past but that they are also accompanied by the conscious experience of one’s recollections (e.g., Wheeler 2000), of feeling that one is the author of the memory, which is what Tulving (1985) has termed autonoetic consciousness, this hypothesis is not something we can test in animals in the absence of agreed non-linguistic markers of consciousness. Clayton and Dickinson (1998) coined the term episodic-like memory to refer to the animal’s ability to remember what where and when, because we have no way of knowing whether or not this form of remembering is accompanied by the autonoetic consciousness that accompanies human episodic recollections.

Keeping Track of Perishable Caches
To test whether food-caching jays could remember the what where and when of specific caching events, Clayton and Dickinson (1998) capitalized on one feature of the scrub-jays’ ecology, namely, the fact that these birds cache perishable food items, such as worms and other invertebrate prey as well as non-degradable nuts and seeds, and as they do not eat rotten items, recovering perishable food is only valuable as long as the food is still fresh. Consequently, the jays might need to remember not only where they have cached but also which foods are perishable and how long ago they hid them. At this point it is also worth noting that not all food-caching animals hide perishable items. Grey squirrels, for example, avoid the problems of perishability that the jays have by removing the cotyledon from acorns before they cache them, preventing the nuts from germinating and thus spoiling as a food source (Steele et al. 2001).

To test whether these birds remember the what where and when of specific caching episodes, the jays were given a series of trials in which they could cache their preferred food, “wax worms,” and the less preferred peanuts in two sand-filled ice cube trays, both of which were made visuo-spatially distinct and trial-unique by attaching Lego Duplo® blocks to the sides of the trays (Clayton and Dickinson 1998). The birds were given the opportunity to cache in different pairs of trays on different trials so that each caching episode was unique. Although the birds had no cue predicting whether or not the wax worms had perished other than the passage of time that had elapsed between the time of caching and the time at which the birds could recover the caches they had hidden previously, the birds rapidly learned that wax worms were fresh when recovered 4 hours after caching, whereas after 124 hours, the worms had decayed. Consequently, the birds avoided the worm caches and instead recovered exclusively peanuts. It was because the animals had been hand-raised, and we therefore knew their precise reinforcement histories, that we could be certain that they had no prior experience of degrading worms.

Having received four pairs of training trials, the birds received a pair of test trials in which the caches were removed prior to recovery and the trays were filled with fresh sand to ensure that the jays could not use any cues emanating directly from the hidden food to choose where to search. The jays searched primarily in the places in which they had hidden the wax worms when the food had been cached 4 hours earlier, but they switched to searching in the peanut sites when the food had been cached 124 hours earlier, suggesting that they did remember what they had hidden in which particular trays and how long ago. Note that the recoveries after both short- and long-retention intervals always occurred at the same time of day (4 hours after caching on the same day as caching or 5 days after caching) and therefore neither circadian rhythms nor the state of hunger at the time of recovery could provide cues to guide the jays’ searching behaviour (see de Kort et al. 2005 for further discussion). 

Subsequent studies extended these findings by testing whether the jays could also keep track of two perishable food types that decayed at different rates (Clayton et al. 2001b). Again, we appealed to the natural ecology of the birds by reasoning that, in the wild, jays may need to keep track of a number of caches that contain different types of perishable foods, ones that decay at different rates. For example, one might expect worms to rot more rapidly than olives. The jays quickly learned that different foods degrade at different rates and had no difficulty keeping track of which perishable foods had been cached where and how long ago. 

We argued that this representation of the time since caching is essential for the efficient recovery of perishable food items, and that Western scrub-jays use a flexible, declarative memory system to do so (Clayton et al. 2001b, 2003b). For example, the jays were also capable of discriminating between episodes in which they had cached the same type of food but in different places and at different times, and thus, on test trials in which no food was actually present at recovery, they searched in those sites in which the worms should still be fresh as opposed to those sites in which the worms would have degraded (Clayton et al. 2001b). Furthermore, when jays received training trials in which the preferred food was found to improve with age rather than deteriorate, the jays switched to searching for the preferred food after the long delay (de Kort et al. 2005), suggesting that the birds were not simply forgetting whether they had cached the preferred food after long time intervals. 

Perhaps the most impressive demonstration of flexibility comes from a study in which the jays were allowed to cache perishable and non-perishable items but then discovered, in the interval between caching and recovery, that the perishable food type degraded more quickly than originally thought (Clayton et al. 2003b). This experiment was also informed by considering another ecological factor concerning the “perishability problem” that the jays face, namely that environmental factors influence how quickly a particular item degrades. For example, an item cached in the shade will take longer to rot than one cached in an area that is exposed to direct sunlight, and the caches are more likely to spoil more quickly if there are a spate of sunny days than if there is a cold spell immediately after caching. Indeed, the jays cache perishable foods in an environment where the rate at which foods decay changes across the year, and from day to day, depending on the weather conditions between caching and recovery; so fast in fact, that flexible learning may be essential to their survival. For jays that live in the Central Valley of California (USA), the ambient temperatures rarely fall below 10oC but may rise to over 40oC between July and September. At such temperatures, caches that consist of various invertebrates, for example, will degrade rapidly in the heat and more slowly in the cold. So the problem for a scrub-jay is not only to learn how quickly a particular food type degrades but also to be capable of updating information in a flexible manner, based on the ecological conditions that occur in the interim between caching the item and recovering it (de Kort et al. 2005). 

Consequently, we reasoned that, if the birds do use a flexible declarative memory system, they should be able to update their knowledge about the rate of perishability of the food and change their search behaviour at recovery accordingly, even though the episodic information about what they cached where and when was encoded prior to the acquisition of the new knowledge about the decay rates. 

The jays were able to do just that: if they cached perishable and non-perishable items in different locations in one tray and then subsequently discovered that the perishable items from another tray had degraded more quickly than they expected, then when given the original tray back the birds switched their search preference in favour of the nuts. The birds continued to search for the perishable food if it had been cached recently, thus showing that they had not simply developed a general aversion to searching for food that might perish. To our knowledge, this is the only published demonstration of the declarative flexibility with which animals can update their information after the time of encoding (Clayton et al. 2003b). 

Food-Caching by Western Scrub-Jays as a Candidate for Assessing Whether Animals Understand Other Minds

Although there are distinct advantages to caching, because food can be hidden for future consumption, this behaviour is both competitive and risky, because other individuals can also steal the caches. The risk of cache theft is significant because up to 30% of caches may be lost each day to pilfering competitors (Vander Wall and Jenkins 2003). 

In most food-caching species that have been studied to date, cache theft is opportunistic; either the competitor finds the cache whilst foraging or, if the pilferer happens to witness the caching event, then the onlooker can see where the cacher has hidden the food and displace that individual, so the food can be stolen there and then (see Dally et al. 2006 for a recent review). In the case of scrub-jays and other members of the corvid family, however, cache theft is particularly problematic because, unlike most food-caching animals, these birds have developed an additional thievery tactic, namely, they can rely on their highly accurate observational spatial memory to steal another’s caches that they saw being made (Bednekoff and Balda 1996a, b; Heinrich and Pepper 1998; Clayton et al. 2001a). Consequently, the scrub-jays and other corvids can wait until the cacher has left the scene and then steal its caches at will, whenever they are hungry, and without having to rely on successfully displacing a potentially more dominant cacher. 

Bugnyar and Kotrschal (2002) suggested that this capacity for observational spatial memory in corvids represented the catalyst for an “evolutionary arms race” between cachers and pilferers, such that pilferers would develop methods for observing cachers as unobtrusively as possible and cachers would come up with strategies to counter the risk of cache pilferage. Furthermore, we have argued that, because these birds act as both the cacher of their own food stores and pilferer of other birds’ caches, they have access to both viewpoints, that of the cacher and that of the thief. It is this role-taking that has led to a refinement of increasingly more sophisticated, cognitively based cache protection and pilfering strategies (Emery et al. 2004). Indeed, we have evidence that this refinement can occur very rapidly (i.e., after one experience). When jays were allowed to cache in two trays when watched by an observer, and then they themselves observed one of the trays being pilfered by this same observer (the other tray was in view, but out of reach), they selectively re-cached from the pilfered tray those items that were remaining, and they re-cached these items in places that could not be reached by either a conspecific or experimenter (i.e., in corners of their home cages; Emery et al. 2004). This behaviour suggests that the strategies used by cachers are significantly influenced by the behaviour of potential thieves. As yet, we have not examined the counter-strategies that may be employed by pilferers to increase their chances of stealing caches without reprisal.  

Critical to a cacher’s use of tactics to counter the risk of cache theft, however, should be the risk that potential thieves pose to their caches, namely whether or not a particular competitor witnessed the caching event and is, therefore, knowledgeable as to cache locations (Clayton et al. 2007). In short, what we are arguing is that the very nature of the cache-pilfering and cache-protection system in these birds has led to the development of complex cognitive processes that may be akin to mental attribution (Emery and Clayton 2004b, 2008). What evidence do we have for making such a controversial claim?

Keeping an Eye on The Competition: The Cache Protection Strategies of Scrub-Jays
In the first set of experiments, we tested whether the jays were sensitive to what a competitor can and cannot see, using a competitive foraging paradigm similar to that which Hare and colleagues (2000, 2001) developed for testing mental attribution by chimpanzees (Dally et al. 2005; Fig. 1). One bird, the cacher, was given the opportunity to hide food in two different, visuo-spatially distinct trays that were placed in its home cage. One of these trays could easily seen by another jay, the observer in the next cage, but the other tray was placed behind a barrier such that it was out of view of the observer. Both trays were equidistant from the observer’s cage. Not surprisingly, the cachers showed a clear preference to hide their food in the tray that was placed behind a barrier when the observer was watching them. However, when the observer’s view of the entire caching event was obscured by a screen so that all caching events were out of the observer’s view, the cacher showed no such preference, hiding approximately equal numbers of food items in both trays. 

[Please insert Figure 1 here]

We reasoned that, if the jays can understand what competitors can and cannot see, they should be able to capitalize on relative differences in the level of visual access that observers have to cache sites. By caching in sites that observers might find hard to see, such as those in the shade, cachers might reduce the quality and transfer of visual information to observers, thereby making the location of cache sites less certain. To determine whether scrub-jays would exploit hard-to-see sites, we examined the effects of sun and shade on a scrub-jay’s choice of where to cache (Dally et al. 2004; Fig. 2). As in the previous experiment, the jays were given the opportunity to cache in two trays that were equidistant from the observer’s cage, but the barrier was removed and a lamp was placed close to each of them. By switching one of the lamps on, and leaving the other switched off, we were able to create a sunny site that was four times as bright as the shady site. When the observer jay could witness the caching event, our cachers were selective, hiding most of their food in the shady tray, but when caching was made in private they placed approximately equal numbers of food items in both caching trays,

[Please insert Figure 2 here]

Subsequent experiments established that the jays also use distance as a cache-protection strategy, preferring to hide food in a tray furthest from the observer when that bird could witness the caching event, yet caching equally in both the near and the far tray when the observer’s view was obscured so that they could cache in private (Dally et al. 2005). Taken together, these results suggest that, like chimpanzees, scrub-jays are sensitive to what a competitor can and cannot see, exploiting a range of environmental variables, including the level of ambient light and the relative distance of cache sites to the observer, to reduce the transfer of visual information available to the potential pilferer. 

Keeping Track of Who was Watching When
In the second set of experiments, we tested whether the jays could keep track of which particular individual was watching them caching during specific caching episodes (Dally et al. 2006a). These experiments were also shaped by thinking about the jays’ natural ecology, in this case the fact that the potential pilferers do not necessarily leave the area in which the cacher has cached, or that whilst the same observers are not always present, there is always another bird in the immediate vicinity. The cachers were given the opportunity to hide food in one of two visuo-spatially unique caching trays in the presence of two different observers in two consecutive caching events (Observer A watches caches being made in Tray A, and Observer B watches caches being made in Tray B), and then to recover their caches either in private, when watched by one of the two observers, or when observed by a “control” bird that had not witnessed either caching event. 

When the jays were given the opportunity to recover their caches in private, they re-cached about 50% of the items they had hidden, moving them to new sites. In the presence of a prior observer, the cachers also re-cached the food items, but their pattern of re-caching was very different from that we saw when they re-cached in private. In the presence of an observer, they repeatedly moved the caches that particular observer had seen them make, re-hiding them in the original caching tray. By moving caches repeatedly, cachers may reduce the accuracy with which the observer would be able to steal their caches, rather like the children’s shell game. Similarly very few caches were moved during the “control” condition. Presumably this is because moving these items would only have provided observers, who were currently ignorant of their existence, with information that they might have been used to facilitate future cache theft. We have argued that, taken together, these findings suggest that the jays do keep track of which particular individual was watching during particular caching events (but see Clayton et al. 2007 for further discussion)





Experience –Projection: It Takes a Thief to Know One
There is one particularly striking finding about the re-caching behaviour of these birds and that is that not all Western scrub-jays engage in it. Emery and Clayton (2001) found that re-caching behaviour depends not only on whether or not the cacher was observed by another jay during caching but also upon the previous experience of being a pilferer. Whereas experienced thieves engaged in high levels of re-caching at recovery when they were observed during the previous caching episode, control birds, who had not been thieves in the past and therefore had no prior experience of stealing other birds’ caches, showed hardly any re-caching at all.

The fact that only experienced jays re-cache has a number of important implications. The first is that this behaviour cannot be innate, otherwise all the birds should re-cache. Importantly, we can also rule out a simple conditioning explanation because the birds never received any positive reinforcement or any punishment for re-caching, given that they never had the opportunity to learn about the fate of the caches that they had re-cached. As a consequence, we can make the inference that the jay used information gained during the previous caching event to anticipate whether or not its caches were likely to be stolen and thus engaged in the appropriate cache-protection strategy at recovery, namely whether or not to re-cache. 

Emery and Clayton (2004b) have argued that the fact that experienced birds differ so dramatically from control birds who lack the experience of being a thief suggests that the experienced jays are not only capable of protective action against future theft but also experience projection. Experience projection refers to a second form of theory of mind, namely the ability to use one’s own experiences – in this case of having been a thief - to predict how another individual might think or behave – in this case what the potential pilferer might do. Experience projection has yet to be demonstrated in any of the great apes, other than humans. Consequently, most people have assumed that experience projection was a uniquely human trait. The jay studies challenge this assumption. The fact that experienced jays re-cache has one further implication: the jays may be sensitive to future needs. After all, the only benefit of re-caching the food at recovery is to increase the likelihood that they will then be able to consume those caches at a later date. In fact, we now have good evidence that these jays can plan for the future (Correia et al. 2007; Raby et al. 2007).

Planning for Tomorrow’s Breakfast
We tested whether the jays could plan for a future motivational need as opposed to a current one, namely for tomorrow’s breakfast (Raby et al. 2007; Fig. 3). To do so, each jay was housed in a three-room compartment in which they could eat but not cache food, because the food was always provided in a powdered form. Each morning, for six days, the jays woke up in one of the two end compartments, such that they received equal amounts of experience with both of them. In one compartment, the jays were always given breakfast and in the other they were not. After this training, the jays were unexpectedly given food to eat and cache in the evening. We reasoned that, if they were capable of thinking about the future, they should cache more food in the compartment in which they had not been given breakfast and therefore would expect to be hungry the next morning, relative to the compartment in which they had been given breakfast. This they did, spontaneously and without prior training.

[Please insert Figure 3 here]

Are Western scrub-jays unique?
We recognise that, by claiming that Western scrub-jays may have episodic memory, future planning and mental attribution, we will be viewed with scepticism by many comparative and human psychologists, especially those who adhere to the ideas that human cognition is unique or that animals do not have minds. Although we have been wary of this throughout our experimental program, and have attempted to control for alternative explanations for our results, we do not think that agreement on these issues will be forthcoming any time in the near future. However, we believe that, aside from the results, there are good biological reasons for why Western scrub-jays and possibly other animals may have these abilities. However, at first glance, our results present a paradox. How can such abilities be present in a bird that is distantly related to us and in one whose brain is the size of a walnut? 

First, evolutionary relatedness to humans does not necessarily imply similar cognitive mechanisms. This out-dated scala naturae view on the evolution of cognition does not follow Darwinian principles (Hodos and Campbell 1969). Evolution does not progress through time like a ladder, with “lower” animals such as insects, fish and reptiles on the bottom rungs and “higher” animals such as birds, mammals and ultimately humans on the top rungs. Neither do animals from one group simply evolve into new animals. Rather speciation spreads like the branches of a tree, in which species adapt to new environments and face new challenges and so change as a result. All species therefore have a common ancestor.  The questions in relation to the evolution of cognition therefore become: at what point in the evolutionary tree did the ability arise (common ancestor) or, if the ability is shared by many species, has the ability arisen through common ascent (homology) or convergence (analogy)? If the trait is homologous, then we expect that most of the species from the common ancestor upwards should share it. For example, as all animals will habituate to repeated presentations of the same stimuli, the appearance of habituation learning in distantly related species must be homologous. By contrast, at the present time, we only have evidence that Western scrub-jays and humans (and possibly apes) can plan for the future. As their last common ancestor of these lived around 300 millions years ago, cognition in corvids and apes have most likely arisen though convergent evolution. In the case of apes and humans, this may also be a case of homology. We have argued that similar cognitive abilities in apes and corvids are a clear example of evolutionary convergence (Emery and Clayton 2004b), which may be the result of similar selection pressures from the complexity of the social and physical environments of these two families, which may have also influenced other animal groups, such as elephants, killer whales and dolphins, which have similar abilities (Emery 2006; Fig. 4). 

[Please insert Figure 4 here]
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